Some tombs which could do with being visited more often: The Birmingham Catacombs – excellent tour available at Birmingham Walking Tours

I am currently reading The End of Everything by M John Harrison, which I will be talking about at greater length in a future post. But one aspect I want to pick up now is how the response of the characters to the disappearance of many of the familiar landmarks post apocalypse is to lose their cognitive bearings. Thoughts come and go, often not joined up. They struggle to understand what other people are saying to them.

I think this is a much under-explored aspect of a period of change. Our ability to think about what is going on, to plan, to anticipate is affected. Many of us experienced this during the pandemic. Psychology as a discipline changed significantly as a result of World War 2.

This is also an aspect that speculative narratives like this one often miss. Told from the vantage point of 2100, it has humanity in despair in 2046:

I imagine that today’s world must have seemed like an impossible dream in 2046, when my parents were born in Charleston. Then, an estimated 60 million people had just died in the Great Hunger. The world had warmed by 2 °C, relative to its average temperature in the late 19th century. Ecosystems were collapsing, led by coral reefs.

Instead there is a scenario of an international climate agreement (“The Geneva Climate Compact”), followed by accelerated climate breakdown leading to emergency geoengineering (mostly solar radiation management) which stops global warming by 2080.

International agreements, emergency sessions of the United Nations (even the idea that such a session in 2047 would be the first such session since the pandemic!) and even the European Union is still present and correct in this otherwise devastated landscape. The problem with these sorts of projections is that everything the projector is not looking at (in this case everything except average global temperatures and their direct impacts) is assumed unchanged. Many climate models do the same thing. Indeed a perfectly valid use of climate models is to change one variable and keep everything else the same to try and measure the impact of that variable.

However to really think about the future you need to look to your novelists. Kim Stanley Robinson’s New York 2140 is a case in point. In it global sea levels have risen by 50 feet. Everyone lives in tower blocks connected by sky bridges which occasionally topple into the canals which were once streets.

I used to think that money markets would not survive events like this, but Robinson posits what I now believe is a more likely future scenario. The Intertidal Property Pricing Index is developed instead, carefully constructed to be reasonably stable despite the instability of the actual real estate being valued, and people bet on it. And soon everyone is fixated on what this index is saying daily rather than the buildings collapsing around them. This is exactly what our finance sector will do of course. There will be money to be made out of such activities after all. And so expectations that they will, in any way, be a leader out of the climate emergency are, in my view, unrealistic.

But also is the idea that our institutions as currently constructed will lead us out of catastrophe, or that a top down maintenance of international institutions will be a dominant feature of a post-apocalyptic world. Any plans we have for the future must be robust against the possible loss of central authority.

This does not lead us towards survivalist prepping, holing up in some remote area with canned foods, bottled water and armaments. As Alex Steffen teaches in his “ruggedization” classes:

I would put to you that if you find yourself in a situation where you’re having to let off some rounds to protect your canned goods, you’ve already failed, you have not understood the assignment.

It means the opposite. Remember another thing about the pandemic: people rose to the occasion, just as politicians sunk to it. People checked on the elderly in their neighbourhoods. In Birmingham for instance:

Within weeks of the crisis unfolding, near on 4,000 mutual aid groups registered on the mutual aid website with an estimated 3 million participants stepping forward to support their neighbours and communities. Widely heralded as the ‘early responders’ to the crisis, these groups – alongside thousands more neighbourhood groups – played a fundamental role in ensuring that local residents received immediate support.

This included “food distribution, errands, shopping and picking up prescriptions for those shielding”.

The truth is we all need each other, we all need back up and connecting with your local community is the most effective way that you can “ruggedize” your life. The characters in Harrison’s book have become isolated from each other.

In Goliath’s Curse, Luke Kemp makes the case that the collapse of the “Goliaths” (large imperial powers which dominate the landscape as now) are often linked with improvements in markers of human flourishing like height, life expectancy and equality. This is because, assuming you can avoid the violence associated with the groups scrabbling for status in the ruins of a collapsed state, the main contributors to that flourishing in the past have been local communities rather than at the state level. He worries that, in our current globalised inter-connected world (Ed Conway’s recent article about The 30,000-mile fish finger is one memorable example) this may not necessarily be our experience the next time. As Kemp says:

It is difficult to see through this fog of uncertainty which groups would fare best post-collapse. For now, being poor in wealth but rich in friends is a better strategy than being a suspicious billionaire under siege in a bunker. Not only that, but cultivating bonds of solidarity and mutual aid rather than ruthless self-interest means that the survivors are more likely to help recreate a world that is worth preserving.

If you want a thought experiment about what happens to the billionaires post-collapse, by the way, I recommend Naomi Alderman’s The Future and Cory Doctorow’s novella The Masque of the Red Death (not that one!). Both dark and hilarious in equal measure.

The future is all of ours to make, but we really need to think about it independently and not necessarily along the tracks that the political class funnel all discussions down. That is a 1% world they are discussing. I will leave the last word to Luke Kemp:

Our greatest achievements are not because of the 1 per cent; they are collective endeavours. As George Eliot once wrote, ‘The growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts…half owing to the number who lived faithfully a hidden life, and rest in unvisited tombs.’ It’s time to drop the 1 per cent view and start paying attention to the unmarked tombs and unknown heroes upon whose shoulders we’ve built our world.

Climate campaigners get very irritated with media talking about the “new normal”, pointing out, quite reasonably, that for it to be the new normal would require a degree of climate stability that we have not got, nor have any prospect of getting while we continue to argue about whether net zero (the policy, remember, which is about moving us to a position where we don’t increase the amount of carbon in the atmosphere year after year) is affordable. Poverty and health campaigners got very irritated by the call to “get back to normal” after the pandemic, when it had so clearly demonstrated how our “normal” way of organising society had failed to protect so many of its citizens. As even I could see in March 2020:

My view is that some things that must be different post COVID are already clear. I think as a society we are going to demand more resilience, for example:

  • Resilience of our health service – this means much higher levels of spending, building deliberate over-capacity into the system in normal times;
  • Resilience of our food supplies, for example strengthening domestic supply chains;
  • Resilience of our population, so that we do not have 1.6 million food parcels needing to be given out in a year by the Trussell Trust, in the absence of a pandemic, for instance; and
  • Resilience of our infrastructure – to everything from floods to banking crises to pandemics to storms and heatwaves.

A picture circulating at the time of a Santiago apartment block with a projection onto it of “No volveremos a la normalidad porque la normalidad era el problema” (we won’t get back to normal because normal was the problem) was actually taken the previous year when the Chilean President had used the word “normality” to justifying lifting the state of emergency, leading to large protests:

Source: https://x.com/inesmorsantos/status/1190192093165211648?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1190192093165211648%7Ctwgr%5E%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fodi.org%2Fen%2Finsights%2Fcovid-19-we-wont-get-back-to-normal-because-normal-was-the-problem%2F “We won’t go back to normal, because ‘the normal’ was the problem.”

But we all have trouble with fast moving situations, or even just moving situations. Remember the media coverage in the early weeks of Covid utterly focused on the number of cases going up each week rather than on the underlying pattern this showed, which had been predicted and could be responded to.

In the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries syllabus, subject CS2 Risk Modelling and Survival Analysis has 20% of its content on dealing with our trouble with moving situations via time series:

It boils down to a number of tricks to turn our moving situation into a non-moving or stationary situation, which we can then analyse.

So not being able to deal with things that aren’t stationary is entirely normal. Indeed the Standard Normal Distribution, originally developed in response to a gambler’s query and another thing that we spend a lot of time transforming other distributions into if we can, has a fixed mean of 0 and a fixed variance (a measure of how far things stray from the mean) of 1:

Outside statistical analysis, we use different techniques to make things appear normal. Denial, ie ignoring the departure from normality, is a big one. When this one is no longer tenable in the face of mounting evidence that we are not in Kansas anymore, we often try and depict where we have got to as normal now. This will have been a good strategy in the past: once a natural disaster has passed, taking stock of what has been lost and what remains and working within these new parameters makes more sense than hankering back to how things were before the disaster struck.

However this strategy comes unstuck when one or both of two things are true:

  1. The disaster, or change-event more generally, is not a one-off but a continuing process.
  2. The way we were living before the disaster made the disaster more likely.

So, on climate change, both 1 and 2 are true. On the pandemic, 2 (if you define the disaster as the number of people who died during it, which I do) is clearly also true. And, although it may not be a continuing process, none other than the former Chief Scientific Advisor to the UK Government regards another pandemic as “inevitable”.

We have built systems to look at past disasters and, in particular, try and guard against 2. The Covid Inquiry is working its way through the evidence about the pandemic, and has already produced definitive evidence on how we could do things differently for those who wish to read it, but the reporting of its work is patchy, with sometimes unhelpful fixations on the wrong thing.

And denial tends to fight back as our go-to defence mechanism, which is why we often seem to need to have Public Inquiries about the same things again and again and again.

It is all quite normal. That is the problem.

In October 2009, while working as a pensions actuary in Birmingham, I attended the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries’ Joining Forces in Mortality and Longevity multidisciplinary conference at the Royal College of Physicians in Edinburgh. The canapés were excellent and, of the plenary speakers, I particularly remember Rudi Westendorp from Leiden University who, in response to the question of whether it was nature or nurture that was responsible for longevity, said it was both.

It was also the first and last time I have used a sleeper train. I had a trustee meeting on the Friday morning south of London and decided that it would be a good idea to get the sleeper from Edinburgh to London on the Thursday night. I hadn’t really researched it in advance and I suppose I was expecting a cabin to myself, but it turned out I was in fact sharing with a German guy who looked like he rode the overnight trains of Europe all the time. There was a set of bunk beds which took up most of the cabin and my memories of that night were of my being thrown around every time the train took a bend down the East Coast mainline, not sleeping a wink while my room-mate snored soundly throughout and then of his taking an annoying amount of time to brush his teeth in the morning. The trustees did not get me at my best.

But I digress. The session from the conference which has stayed with me ever since was by Eugene Milne from Newcastle University. As the blurb for his session A new model of mortality and survival stated:

A new mathematical model mimics patterns of mortality in species from nematodes to humans. Net risk, it suggests, arises from two components, an interactive element accounting for historical falls in human mortality, and redundant decay which shapes lifelong risk. This suggests “intrinsic ageing” is unrelated to the slope of the mortality curve, and is unlikely to have altered for humans in recent centuries.

Eugene Milne went on to become Director of Public Health for Newcastle and took them through the pandemic. The full paper in the British Actuarial Journal from 2009 is here.

At a time where actuarial mortality modelling consisted either of projecting observed trends into the future (with no real explanatory power for observed features like cohort effects) or attempted to project a range of causes of mortality based on the likely progress in treating them (which is limited by the quality of information on death certificates), Milne’s model stood out for starting from a biological model of gradually diminishing redundancy within the body. He recognised its limitations, as he said at the time:

As a bridge between actuarial and biological approaches to ageing it falls, as yet, between two stools. The examples in this paper are generated by probabilistic computer modelling. This is clearly not adequate for
actuarial use and the model needs to be developed further to provide a form that will serve that purpose. On the other hand, it describes (as noted in section 4) a biology that would be ‘needed’ in order to construct organismal risk as it is observed. This it does well, providing a coherent account of why mortality patterns appear as they do. Yet its theoretical ‘biology’ is at odds with currently favoured theories of ageing. If the biological quantity described in the NBM [nested binomial model] as redundancy exists, we do not yet know what it is, nor why it should appear to act in so sequestered and consistent a fashion.

But the idea stayed with me, and perhaps that made me particularly receptive to Richard Murphy’s recent article about allostatis, which he describes as “the way living organisms survive by continually adapting to the changing world around them”. As Murphy points out:

If something breaks, a wealthy person can simply have it repaired or replaced. If travel arrangements fail, alternatives can be found. If income is interrupted, there are savings to draw upon. Problems remain, because they always will, but they rarely threaten the stability of everyday life for a wealthy person. In other words, the amount of adaptation required of them is reduced.

There have been a number of attempts over the years to draw attention to how your level of income affects your ability to adapt to your environment.

In George Orwell’s Down and Out in Paris and London, he describes the effect of poverty:

For, when you are approaching poverty, you make one discovery which outweighs some of the others. You discover boredom and mean complications and the beginnings of hunger, but you also discover the great redeeming feature of poverty: the fact that it annihilates the future.

However Orwell has been criticised, as the temporary tramp that he was, for deciding that meant the end of anxiety. More recently, Jack Monroe used Terry Pratchett’s example of Captain Vimes’ boots, to illustrate how what life costs depended on how much you already had:

A really good pair of leather boots, the sort that would last years and years, cost fifty dollars. This was beyond his pocket and the most he could hope for was an affordable pair of boots costing ten dollars, which might with luck last a year or so before he would need to resort to makeshift cardboard insoles so as to prolong the moment of shelling out another ten dollars.

Therefore over a period of ten years, he might have paid out a hundred dollars on boots, twice as much as the man who could afford fifty dollars up front ten years before. And he would still have wet feet.

Jack developed the Vimes Boots Index to highlight inflation in basic food products, which then persuaded the ONS to launch a shopping prices comparison tool.

But to return to the idea of redundancy: it is clear that if you have, say, redundant money which can be brought in to play when things go wrong, then things generally go much better for you. But imagine if you have used up any redundancy quite some time ago and therefore any reverse is a potential crisis. Your stress levels will be much higher all of the time, as your body tenses for the battles it knows lie ahead about anything from a car that won’t start to a boiler that packs up to a hike in the price of bus fares or the basic food products on the Vimes Boots Index. Day in, day out.

At the moment one of the differentials in redundancy is around heat stress. Housing which cannot be cooled without electricity which cannot be afforded. Day in, day out, for much of the summer so far. But in winter the same housing will need far more heating because its occupants cannot afford capital investment like insulation.

And the reason for this enormous inequality in the level of redundancy, is of course wealth and income inequality. The Equality Trust sets out the statistics as follows:

The UK has very high inequality of income compared to other developed countries; the 9th most unequal incomes of 38 OECD countries (OECD, 2022).

The UK’s wealth inequality is much more severe than income inequality, with the top fifth taking 36% of the country’s income and 63% of the country’s wealth, while the bottom fifth have only 8% of the income and only 0.5% of the wealth according to the Office for National Statistics.

And this stress, day in, day out, means that people also die earlier, as shown below in the House of Commons Library research briefing on Inequalities in life expectancy, using ONS figures (and honestly they’re not picking on Blackpool):

And yet the most likely way for you to hear the word redundancy is when some company is planning to get rid of some of its workforce.

The trouble with people is that you don’t need them until you do, as Jonn Elledge has written here:

There are substantial differences between the US military and the NHS: but what both have in common is that, when they need something, they really do need it. The entire notion of “efficiency” is misplaced.

Similarly, in Nate Hagens’ latest interview, with biologist and biophysicist Olivier Hamant, they explore:

…how cheap, abundant energy allowed human societies to substitute the “safety net” of resource abundance for the safety net that living systems actually rely on: diversity, redundancy, and cooperation.

Until the resources stopped being so abundant.

And then there is the kind of workplace sustained redundancy programmes create, as Seth Godin says in a recent blog post:

“How few people can we get away with?” That’s a question many bosses think hard about. Automate. Streamline. Improve productivity and take humans out of as many tasks as possible. It’s a time-tested way to create profits and to increase a certain kind of reliability. Claude Code is popular with many organizations for precisely this reason.

“How can we include more people into this process?” is a less popular but often more valid way to create value. In an organization that is in the business of bringing insights, humanity and care to problems, more involvement from people creates better outcomes. The challenges make it far more valuable.

Which sort of organization would you like to work for?

And what sort of society do we want to have? One that supports the people in the bottom quintile with no redundant capital, so that they might have the resources available to maintain the stability of everyday life and reduce the adaptation required of them? Or one which keeps demanding more and more from those it allocates less and less of national wealth to. To quote from another Orwell book, Nineteen Eighty-Four, from the mouth of O’Brien, Big Brother’s Grand Inquisitor:

If you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot stamping on a human face—for ever.

I think we can all come up with better pictures of the future than that one.

Two events recently have made me think about the last 55 years in a different way. The first was the last Birmingham Science Fiction Group meeting, which we had dedicated to a 55 year anniversary celebration for the group (the 50th anniversary having been pandemicked). We had a cake, illustrated by David Hardy’s Stratus Hotel, and we showed a film of interviews from members across the years, again featuring some of David Hardy‘s artwork, with stories about guest speakers from Asimov to Frank Herbert to Iain Banks to Jack Cohen and very frank recollections from our current honorary president, Alastair Reynolds. If you want to see the film, you need to join the Group, which you can easily do by emailing us at contact@brumsfgroup.org.uk. Seeing some of the original organisers talking about some of these meetings like they had just happened made me reflect on how we often attribute significance to things after the event and tend to downplay things happening around us now. Things are both never as good or important as they used to be and, of course, as we prove to ourselves over and over again, they also are.

The other event was a visit with my brother and his wife to where we used to live, in the officers’ married quarters of an RAF station in Yorkshire, 55 years ago, when I was eight. Just standing on this patch of grass, with a field of wheat still growing the other side of the fence (to the right), I got a very strong sense of another way of getting from there to here. Obviously there was the one I had taken, with countless house moves, school moves, marriages, careers, children, holidays, illnesses and death and grief and so much joy and laughter in the very fortunate and privileged life I have lived.

But what if I had just stood here and the 55 years had just sped past me instead. My Liverpool football kit would have been a bit tight, with the number seven sewn on the back by my Mum (actually that might have been the following year, when the full magnificence of Kevin Keegan had become apparent). Or, much more spookily, if the eight-year-old just found themselves on the same patch of grass 55 years later in a Wells’ The Time Machine kind of way. It all suddenly felt just as possible and plausible, as if the 55 year old football-and-everything-else pitch was still there within touching distance somehow.

The thing is, I could understand the world of 1971, once I had been reminded of a few things no doubt. A world of cash (just decimalised so no shillings and old pence), phones fixed to houses and telephone boxes, smaller cars filled with leaded petrol, three channels on the black and white TV. I had just driven up there in a car with bodywork comprising mostly plastics, with no spare tyre and no wallet. Just a device known as a mobile which can not only make calls, but send and receive text messages, carry out all my financial transactions and navigate me to my brother’s house. My eight-year-old self would recognise very little about this world beyond the patch of grass he stood on and the field beyond the fence where he had parachuted his mother’s childhood teddy bear.

And this is the terrifying thing about life: we are all that eight-year-old facing the incomprehensible future, and so much of what we spend our time doing is trying to deal with that fear and lack of understanding with often meaningless structures and practices and customs to ward off the sense of being totally out of control. Trump is scary because he appears to have taken a lot of the guard rails off the path we are on, with little sense that he understands what he is doing. AI is scary because it is putting its foot on the accelerator before we have a clear idea of where we are going. Climate change is scary because we no longer look like we are headed where we thought we were.

And we try and stick some grit in the wheels to slow down the disruption to our own little bit of the world, whether to our sense of ourselves, or to how we think life should be lived. And sure we need to question whether we need to change things which are working perfectly well, but often the driver for resisting change is fear of what we don’t know is coming and finding familiar things irresistibly reassuring.

And when we realise that it is not just us with our, certainly in my case, fairly small and unimportant lives (although obviously very important to us!), but also the people who seem to be shaping the world around us that feel these insecurities and uncertainties, the possibility of working together to make it easier to adapt to the very weird future that is coming suddenly doesn’t seem so outlandish after all.

I think this – what we resist, what we create and what we could nurture in the face of this terrifying future – is what I am going to be writing about for the rest of this year, as we all rattle on down the road in the back of someone’s van.

Source: https://xkcd.com/249/ This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 2.5 License

It all started for me in May 2017, with the challenge from Daniel and Richard Susskind in their book “The Future of the Professions”, which set out two possible futures for the professions. Either:

  • They carry on much as they have since the mid 19th century, but with the use of technology to streamline and optimise the way they work; or
  • Increasingly capable machines will displace the work of current professionals.

Their research suggested that, while these two futures would exist in parallel for some time, in the long run the second future would dominate. The actuarial profession was going to be particularly vulnerable. As the Susskinds wrote:

Accountants and consultants, for example, are particularly effective at encroaching on the business of lawyers and actuaries.

I stood in the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries Council elections that month, on a platform saying that we needed to urgently respond to this challenge. I didn’t get elected.

However, at the University of Leicester we pursued a curriculum transformation programme in response to this challenge aimed at developing actuaries of the future who had:

  • Highly developed presentation skills, both in writing and in speech
  • Great team working skills
  • Strong IT skills – comfortable with working with data
  • Clarity about why they are there and the desire to use their skills to solve problems

The 2017 post also talked about emerging trends which had hardly started at all yet:

  • The end of reserved roles for actuaries
  • Different ways of communicating advice
  • Online self-help for users of actuarial advice
  • The advance of roboactuaries and their assistants

A paper called 2036: An actuarial odyssey with AI written for the Society of Actuaries in July 2016 by Dodzi Attimu and Bryon Robidoux discussed the possibilities for robo actuaries and robo actuarial analysts.

They estimated that robo actuarial analysts would be with us in 5-10 years and would provide:

A system that has limited cognitive abilities but can undertake specialized activities, e.g. perform the heavy lifting in model building (once the specification/configuration is created), perform portfolio optimization, generate reports including narratives (e.g. memos) based on data analysis, etc.

Whereas a robo actuary was more like 15-20 years away and which they also helpfully described:

We mean a software system that can more or less autonomously perform the following activities: develop products, set assumptions, build models based on product and general risk specifications, develop and recommend investment and hedging strategies, generate memos to senior management, etc.

Then, in 2018, there was the whole Bullshit Jobs argument posed by the late David Graeber, discussing Keynes’ prediction in 1930 that:

In quite a few years – in our own lifetimes I mean – we may be able to perform all the operations of agriculture, mining, and manufacture with a quarter of the human effort to which we have been accustomed.

Graeber, in Bullshit Jobs, pointed out that this never happened, despite pretty much all of the technological developments and income increases which Keynes predicted. He suggested that the future which the Susskinds were predicting is already happening in terms of needing fewer people to fill the meaningful roles within organisations but that, rather than employing fewer people, we are either creating “bullshit” jobs which even the people doing them can see no point to or bullshitizing existing roles for which the meaningful need has passed. It was as if the organisations themselves have attempted to maintain the outward appearance of the same structures by disguising the hollowing out of so many of their functions with simulated business.

Why? One of the reasons he thought the situation had been allowed to develop was that noone believed that capitalism could produce such an outcome. Graeber gave the example of the creation of Obamacare, where Barack Obama “bucked the preferences of the electorate and insisted on maintaining a private, for-profit health insurance system in America” in order to protect jobs in health insurance.

Then we had the pandemic, and the painful return to work which found that people were not necessarily keen to return to populating those office empires, preferring to work remotely. Some of the attempts by the captains of industry to get them back were a little desperate.

Now nine or ten years on from the initial challenge, we are deluged in articles about how AI is impacting different areas of actuarial work, whether it is already replacing graduate roles and what actuarial students need to do to make themselves employable. And now the blinkers also seem to have come off about capitalism not producing the need for fewer jobs.

Ian Pay of the ICAEW’s quote from last year was just one example:

Historically, accountancy firms have typically had a pyramid structure – wide base, heavy graduate recruitment. Firms are now starting to talk about a ‘diamond model’ with a wide middle tier of management because, ultimately, AI is not sophisticated enough yet to make those judgment calls.

But hang on a moment. Now there is something called an “AI boomerang”. Sam Altman of Open AI and Dario Amodei of Anthropic have both been backtracking on their predictions of job lay offs due to AI. As the Gold and Geopolitics Substack puts it:

Two-thirds of the companies that ran AI-driven layoffs last year are now rehiring. One in three spent more on the rehiring than they saved on the original cuts. Robert Half calls them “AI boomerangs” – which is the name a consultant invents when there’s a market in unwinding what the last consultant sold you.

The last few years of AI-generated headlines (in both senses of the phrase) have been quite the rollercoaster.

I do not want to add to the deluge, as currently you would need a LLM summarising reports for you 24/7 just to keep up with it as it is.

And there are good reasons for not rushing to judgement on this. It is only six weeks ago that the Bank of England’s Head of Financial Stability warned that global stock markets are overvalued. As she said:

The thing that really keeps me awake at night is the likelihood of a number of risks crystallising at the same time – a major macroeconomic shock, confidence in private credit goes, AI and other risky valuations readjust – what happens in that environment and are we prepared for it?

Since then, the economics of the major AI players has only got more bonkers. In this environment, there is considerable uncertainty about what students should be learning to prepare them for the world they will need to rebuild from the rubble of the current one.

Daniel Susskind reckons a “no regret” strategy for education would focus on the basics, which he describes as literacy, numeracy and critical thinking, and the critical use of AI. Carlo Iacono talks about the work which will always be hard to automate as follows:

The work that depends on reading a room. The work that relies on institutional memory. The work where the important fact is not in the document. The work where the answer is political, ethical or relational as much as technical. The work where being right is not enough, because someone has to be accountable for the consequences.

But you have to get into the organisation first before you can develop much of this. I remain reasonably comfortable with our prescription from 2017 in terms of broadly what the curriculum should be trying to achieve. Curriculum changes take time and, tempting though it is to pile into syllabus changes aimed at incorporating the latest cutting edge technological developments, the likelihood is that you will be arriving at the wrong fire. As a social media post this week put it:

The danger is that, as Agentic AI in particular looks so much like the predictions of 2016, we declare it the new messiah and bet everything on this being the future. I certainly think that 2036 will look very different to now, but I am not convinced that we have the shape of it yet. This may just be another bullshit alternative, waiting for the next crisis to mutate into something else.

What we can say with certainty is that the future for early professionals is as uncertain as any of us can remember. And, in my view, the best way to support our young people starting their professional lives (or whatever is going to replace professional lives) is to make the value they add much clearer to anyone who might want to work with them in the future.

Future education systems are going to need to help their graduates demonstrate their value in ways they haven’t historically needed to. AI has not brought new problems, it has accelerated existing ones. And the gap between actual actionable skills, knowledge and experience and the credentials which are supposed to represent them is the key one I believe as far as those graduates are concerned.

Because currently the companies who might want to take them on have to guess what they can do to a large extent. What does a 1st mean? A 2.1? Do the differences matter to their employer? Should they interrogate the details of student courses? How would they incorporate that into a manageable recruitment process? Some people see a future of AI generated applications by the thousand per student doing battle with AI powered triage systems operated by potential employers.

This is already an issue in academia. The conclusions of one academic paper on submissions to one major academic journal were stark:

Submission volume has risen 42% since the late 2022 release of ChatGPT, while writing quality has declined. The rise in AI-generated writing accounts for nearly all of these trends.

On the other hand, researchers complain about the increasing use of AI peer review to try and cope with these increased volumes, and some have tried to game the LLMs they believe they are dealing with.

I think we can do better than this in actuarial teaching and learning.

And this will be the subject of my next post.

Source: https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/healthandsocialcare/healthandlifeexpectancies/datasets/healthstatelifeexpectancyallagesuk

Yesterday an extraordinary thing happened: the news story about the UK’s falling healthy life expectancy led the BBC News for a while, ahead of the King’s visit to the US in the wake of the assassination attempt on Trump’s team and the latest twists in the Mandelson affair. And so it should: over the decade 2012–14 to 2022–24, healthy life expectancy in the UK fell by about 2 years, to 60.7 years for males and 60.9 years for females.

And that is just the average. As we can see from what I felt was the most informative graphic from the Health Foundation’s report, some of the local authority areas have seen precipitous falls over the same period. Merthyr Tydfil has fallen from 57.6 years to 50.1 years. North Lanarkshire has fallen from 58.3 years to 52.3 years. And in England, Sandwell has fallen from 57.7 years to 51.3 years. In the 2012-14 data, only one region had no local authorities with a healthy life expectancy below the state pension age. By 2022-24, most regions have a healthy life expectancy below 66 years.

Healthy Life Expectancy (HLE) is defined as the number of remaining years that an individual can expect to live in “very good” or “good” general health. Rates of “very good” and “good” general health by sex and five-year age band are captured from the following survey general health question on the Annual Population Survey (APS) and in the Census 2011 and Census 2021:

How is your health in general; would you say it was…

  • Very good?
  • Good?
  • Fair?
  • Bad?
  • Very bad?

I last wrote about HLE in 2017 in response to John Cridland’s review of the State Pension Age. My view at that time, when healthy life expectancy was plateauing rather than falling like a stone, was that it was time to consider a universal basic income model. Then only the poorest decile was going to be condemned to 18 years of working in poor health until they could claim a state pension. Now the overall averages in some local authorities have moved down to join them, this consideration appears rather more urgent.

In 2014, I was concerned about what happens if the healthy life expectancy doesn’t increase in line with the planned increases to the State Pension Age and, towed along 10 years behind it, Normal Minimum Pension Age (NMPA). Well here we are: 26 of the little local authority blobs are at or below the current NMPA of 55. This nearly doubles to 49 local authorities (assuming the fall in HLE doesn’t continue, which feels like a heroic assumption at the moment) when the NMPA is due to rise to 57 in April 2028.

As the Health Foundation report says:

While healthy life expectancy has declined, life expectancy has remained broadly stable for the UK overall, indicating that the deterioration is not primarily driven by changes in mortality. However, in more deprived areas, life expectancy remains below pre-pandemic levels, suggesting mortality plays a greater role in reducing healthy life expectancy in these areas. Worsening self-reported health remains a key factor throughout the UK, highlighted by a falling proportion of life spent in good health and by wider evidence of declining health among the working-age population.

Other countries have not experienced this, illustrated by the UK sliding down the international comparison tables:

Source: https://www.who.int/data/gho/data/indicators/indicator-details/GHO/gho-ghe-hale-healthy-life-expectancy-at-birth

In the complete table the UK is sandwiched between Puerto Rico and China, with (from World Bank data) GDP per capita respectively of $39,344 and $13,303, compared to the UK’s GDP per capita of $53,246 (all from 2024).

Andrew Mooney, The Health Foundation’s principal data analyst, said: “The UK has the highest levels of obesity in western Europe and there has been a surge in mental ill health, especially among young people.”

Perhaps, instead of obsessing over GDP growth, we should be focusing on what countries like Iceland, Norway, Australia and New Zealand have been doing in recent years to tackle population health. I think it would make us all feel better.

This review originally appeared in the April issue of Brum Group News, the newsletter of the Birmingham Science Fiction Group and is reproduced here (with light editing) by kind permission

A few years ago the historian Adam Tooze said the following about the times we are living in:

If you’ve been feeling confused and as though everything is impacting on you at the same time, this is not a personal, private experience. This is actually a collective experience.

The word he came up with for this experience was “polycrisis”. It described the interplay of the Covid pandemic, Ukraine war and the energy, cost-of-living and climate crises. To that we could now add Trump 2nd term, war in Gaza and now the Gulf.

I am reviewing this book while I have Covid, which has certainly facilitated the kind of inner focus which I think the book is asking for. Because Slow Gods is polycrisis in the form of space opera, but a curiously interior-monologuey kind of space opera, more psychological than boom-boom.

The premise, as Claire North set out for us at the Birmingham Science Fiction Group last June, is that a binary star system is due to collapse which will obliterate all life within an 83 light-year blast radius. Unusually, the populations in the vicinity are warned of this precisely 100 years in advance by a perfect black sphere moving through space at sub-light-speed and known by everyone as the Slow.

The Slow listens to everything, remembers it and will consider it.

We follow the story through the eyes of Maw, who has been killed and has recovered in such a way as to be very difficult to kill after that. Making Maw an ideal candidate for Pilot, the organic sentient needed in the pilot’s seat of any ship wishing to enter arcspace which lets it travel across the universe faster than light, at huge personal cost. Pilots die frequently and each planetary system has its own way of choosing and rewarding its Pilots. Only Maw appears to be able to act as Pilot again and again, which makes the people around Maw nervous.

The main thing about Maw which makes people nervous is Maw’s relationship with “the darkness” which reaches into any ship in arcspace, in many cases sending people mad. Maw, instead, becomes “curious”, exploiting a changing relationship and perception of matter in the darkness to do monstrous things. But, despite all this, Maw is still required to keep running missions, although usually with a mechanical assistant to keep Maw from getting “dysregulated”.

This unusual set up turns out to be a way of observing the psychology of the polycrisis with some clarity. The United Social Venture is an empire where its subjects acquired debt just from being born (measured in Glint):

Everything the Venture gave us – the air we breathed, the roads we walked down, the schools we learned in – had been sweated for, bled for, and our debts were a marker of the needful labour we would give back in return.

This economic system was referred to as Shine. The Shine were one of the few systems which used prisoners for Pilot work.

One of the joys of the book is the exploration of difference, lots of details about avoiding giving offence when the Xi of Xihanna ask Maw to pilot a ship to Adjumir to bring out historical artefacts and Maw meets Gebre of the Haalo Institute. Maw finds that Normspeak is regarded as a very crude way of communicating and starts, haltingly, to learn Adjumiri (which is at least in part a click language). So begins a very moving love story.

Gender differences between systems are very striking. The Shine have only two genders – “he” and “she” – although the elite also have hé and shé. The most manly and the most feminine.

There are four genders in Xihanna, but they are not regarded as particularly important characteristics of a person and dispensed with once you know someone well. On Adjumir, there are eight, with very few Adjumiris remaining the same gender all their lives. These differences are picked out by the brilliant use of pronouns, a useful technique in a book full of characters. Even mechanicals, who have no particular interest in gender, are referred to as qe/qis as a mark of respect as “they do not wish to be put in the same category as a bowl of soup or a broken chair”.

We join Maw towards the end of the 100 year programme to evacuate the populations of Adjumir and Hadda to relative safety, with 800 million still on the planets and increasingly desperate. The Slow has effectively taken on a role as God through its massive databases, calculation capacity and sheer longevity. It seeks out Maw as it has plans for him. The Slow has been around so long that qe sees everything in the very long run. Which means that the emotional turmoil and intense highs and lows of individual lives are all averaged out to nothing. Qe calculates in terms of galaxy-level populations on the basis of what qe has come to think of as love.

What calculation would the Slow make about our world, with all our nation states and their often tiny differences blown up to justify war aims? Donald Trump certainly has to have the most Shine of any US President for some time.

Slow Gods moves slowly but relentlessly towards a showdown between Maw and Theodosius Rhode, the Executor of the Shine and executioner of his mother. There is much tragedy along the way and the ending is not straightforward but ultimately very satisfying. It’s an uplifting ride.

OK I don’t know if this is a remotely helpful post, but it really feels to me like one of those months we will look back on, like March 2020, and wonder what we were thinking. To recap: on 4 March 2020, while Italy were shutting all their schools and a month after the WHO had declared a global health emergency, we were noting that the number of cases in the UK had jumped from 53 to 87 in one day.

Jump forward to now and the number of tankers with oil on board is in freefall:

Trump is talking about invading Kharg Island and “obliterating” Iran’s energy facilities, and we are sitting in the time lags of international fossil fuel freight waiting to see what will happen. But we already know what is going to happen. Just like the pandemic, we will be taking similar measures to the countries already more affected very soon. The order looks like Asia, followed by Africa, then Europe and only then, ironically, the United States.

So what is going on in Asia right now? Well the Philippines announced a national energy emergency six days ago, setting up an authority to oversee the orderly distribution of fuel, food, medicines, and other essential goods. Sri Lanka has announced a four-day week for all government employees. Egypt is ordering restaurants, cafés and shops to close at 9pm to safeguard dwindling energy reserves. Slovenia has brought in fuel rationing. Moldova’s Parliament has also voted to impose a state of emergency in the country’s energy sector. Australia is offering free public transport. Measures are also being taken in Thailand, Ethiopia, Myanmar, Vietnam, Bangladesh and South Sudan.

On 3 March 2020, the UK Government unveiled their Coronavirus Action Plan, which outlined what the UK had done and what it planned to do next. Paul Cosford, a medical director at Public Health England, said widespread transmission of COVID-19 in the United Kingdom was “highly likely”.

On 4 March 2020, the Daily Express were telling us:

Which we clearly weren’t. Meanwhile the Daily Mail was anticipating future lockdowns and 6 million people being off sick:

The next day we had the first Covid death in the UK. And life was on hold for the next two years.

Our response to the energy crisis seems to be almost entirely focused on

1. The cost-of-living crisis; and

2. The financial markets.

The Education Secretary has said that motorists should fill up as normal as the government is “well prepared” for disruption. The trouble is, many of us still remember September 2000:

So that would be enough to make us all feel nervous about shortages and queues for everything, having our lives disrupted and out of our control. But the real potential issue is not even being talked about, certainly not by the government. It is a shortage of food. Steve Keen sets out the economics of global food production here. This does not tend to feature prominently in mainstream economic analyses which are energy and food blind for the most part, although the FT did have this graph a couple of weeks ago:

As Steve Keen says:

Survival will depend on grain reserves. China has of the order of 18 months in reserve, which will insulate it from the disruptions of 2026. The USA and India have substantial reserves as well, but some countries—including the UK—have virtually none.

…Famines will ensue, and even countries that have never experienced such events could be forced into food rationing. This includes the UK and Australia, and a patchwork of countries across Europe.

This is what people are nervous about: not being able to get enough food, either because it isn’t available at all or not at a price they can afford. Calling that a cost-of-living crisis is a bit like calling the Black Death a labour market crisis. And it doesn’t stop there. As Steve Keen continues:

Other critical products that normally pass through the Strait of Hormuz include Helium, which is critical to the production of semiconductors, and sulphuric acid, which is critical to numerous production processes. The closure of the Strait cuts off one third of global helium output and about half of global sulphuric acid output.

With critical industrial inputs cut as well, the problems will cascade well past food alone—though that is clearly the most damaging impact. With LNG, petroleum, helium and sulphuric acid production cut, the capacity to undertake repairs to damaged facilities will also be hindered.

The TED War is rather like smashing a spider’s web—and then killing the spider.

The spider certainly looks in a poor state of health at the moment, and parts of the web will take years to fix. This is the crisis we are all inevitably going to be entering in the next few weeks. For who knows how long.

A risk management approach to this crisis would involve communicating a plan to the country that minimised the impulse to hoard resources and protected the most vulnerable from extreme prices, rather than bland reassurances from government ministers. We need this to be in place very quickly now.

I have caught Covid for the third time this week, so naturally my thoughts have turned to how it all began.

There are a few Covid posts starting to turn up online as the 6th anniversary of it all rumbles around. The British Foreign Policy Group have helpfully published a timeline from which I have taken everything that happened before Boris Johnson locked us down for the first time:

So a lot had happened by 23 March. You will all have your favourite bits from the saga above, I think mine is 22 January, when Public Health England announced they had moved the risk level to the general public from very low to low.

I remember teaching a macroeconomics class on 12 March when we knew it was going to be the last session on campus. The penny hadn’t dropped. Students were asking about how they would hand work in. We agreed it would have to be online. Some lecturers were talking about microwaving paper submissions to sterilise them. We had a little giggle about that. I had spoken to Stuart McDonald (now MBE) earlier that day where we had reluctantly agreed to postpone his visit to campus to speak to the Leicester Actuarial Science Society (LASS). Stuart would of course become one of the actuarial stars of the pandemic for his work with the COVID-19 Actuaries Response Group. I had a similar conversation by email with Lord Willetts, who was Chancellor at the University of Leicester at the time and who was going to talk to LASS about his books The Pinch and A University Education. We talked of postponing rather than cancelling. The realisation that everything was changing for the foreseeable future was still not there.

It took a long time for the penny to drop for the Government as well. As this analysis of the establishment of the “Covid Disinformation Ecosystem” says:

January featured fear and disbelief, February proved covid couldn’t simply be ignored, March was when governments realised the hospitalisation rate could overwhelm healthcare.

And a Government that was slow to respond initially was very vulnerable to the groups which sprung up during 2020 and 2021. As the Counter Disinformation Project says:

And the main initial target for the UK section of the ecosystem was Boris Johnson who was meeting privately with newspaper owners and editors. Enough doubt was put into Johnson’s mind that he dithered and delayed when cases began to rise, leading to a private meeting with Heneghan, Gupta and Sweden’s Anders Tegnell in September before he chose to ignore his scientific advisors’ calls for a circuit breaker lockdown. In the run up to the deadliest weeks of the pandemic the papers were calling for Johnson to “Save Christmas’.

However I don’t want to focus on our collective inability to make decisions during crises this time. This time I want to focus on the impact of the pandemic on our mental health.

By coincidence, today the 386 page Module 3 report from the Covid Inquiry on The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic on the healthcare systems of the United Kingdom was published. The longer this Inquiry goes on, the more it appears to resemble a truth and reconciliation commission rather than something likely to improve the handling of future pandemics. It gets past transgressions on the record, but in a way designed to move us on rather than improve our preparedness and organisation. I certainly saw nothing in the summaries that I didn’t already know. Module 3 has made 10 recommendations. The only one which mentions mental health at all is the last one on Psychological and emotional support for healthcare workers.

Looking through the module titles, it would seem that this is unlikely to be rectified until Module 10 – Impact on society – reports, currently scheduled for the first half of 2027. I find this relegation of our collective trauma to the lowest priority astonishing.

Two years ago, the Centre for Mental Health produced a review of the evidence so far on COVID-19 and the Nation’s Mental Health. They noted that:

Data on the prevalence of mental health difficulties is harder to assess. For children and young
people, surveys in England have provided a time series since 2020 that suggests very strongly that
mental ill health is indeed more prevalent now than it was before the start of the pandemic. A steady
rise in the decade prior to 2020 seems to have been followed by a sharp rise, and numbers have
stayed high ever since. We do not have the equivalent data for adults, meaning that a clear picture
has yet to emerge, but there is persuasive evidence that levels of mental ill health have been rising
over the last decade, and the pandemic has contributed to many of the risk factors people face.

Before concluding as follows:

Crucially, the pandemic exposed fault-lines in the nation’s mental health, and the stark inequalities
faced every day by people living with mental illness. The public’s mental health was deteriorating
in the years running up to the pandemic, and mental health services were struggling to deal with
the consequences of many years of underfunding and austerity measures across public services.
People with a mental illness were already dying 15-20 years sooner than the general population, and
facing widespread hardship. The pandemic exacerbated these inequalities, creating new risks to
people’s mental health and reducing access to support.

We now have the opportunity to learn from this experience and build a mentally healthier future.
We can act now to boost the public’s mental health in the aftermath of the pandemic, protecting
those who have experienced the worst effects and offering better support to groups that don’t yet
have access to the right support. And we can incorporate mental health into preparations for future
emergencies, so that responses are psychologically informed from day one.

They also made 10 recommendations, mostly for the NHS and Department for Health and Care, but also covering education, communications and considerations for the upcoming (at the time) review of the Mental Health Act. Less than half of these recommendations have been addressed at all.

Now we are two years on from that report, what has changed?

Well, Roy Lilley has drawn a rather dispiriting picture for us. He draws attention to Wes Streeting’s announcement in the Health Service Journal on 12 March, that the proportion of the NHS budget spent on mental healthcare would be cut for the third year in a row. Lilley lists how the demands on mental health services have mushroomed since before the pandemic:

  • Around two million people were in touch with mental health services in 2019, today it’s around three million;
  • Child and Adolescent Services: in 2019 around 500,000 referrals. Now around a million;
  • And only around 45% of referrals are accepted, meaning the true demand is even higher;
  • Talking therapies are up by 60%; and
  • Crisis team referrals and sectioning under the Mental Health Act are also up 60%.

And he summarises the problem like this:

The total economic cost of mental ill-health in England in 2022 was estimated ~£300bn a year when lost productivity, welfare and wider costs are factored in.

The total MH budget is about £16bn. Meaning, the NHS is spending roughly £1 trying to address a £18 national problem.

It feels like we are still waiting for the penny to drop.


In my last post I referred to Dan Wang’s excellent new book, Breakneck, which I have now read at (for me) breakneck speed, finishing it in a week. It has made me realise how very little I knew about China.

Wang makes the point that China today is reminiscent of the US of a century ago. However he also makes the point that parts of the US were terrible to live in then: from racist segregation and lack of representation, to massive industrial pollution and insensitive planning decisions. As he says of the US:

The public soured on the idea of broad deference to US technocrats and engineers: urban planners (who were uprooting whole neighborhoods), defense officials (who were prosecuting the war in Vietnam), and industry regulators (who were cozying up to companies).

China meanwhile has a Politburo stuffed with engineers and is capable of making snap decisions without much regard to what people want. There is a sense of precarity about life there, with people treated as aggregates rather than as individuals. The country can take off in different directions very quickly and often does – there is a telling passage about the totally different life experiences of someone born in 1959 compared to someone born in 1949 (the worst year to be born in China according to Wang) – and even the elites can be dealt with brutally if they fall out of line with the current direction of travel. But they have created some impressive infrastructure, something which has become problematic for the US. Only around 10% of its GDP goes towards social spending, compared to 20% in the US and 30% amongst some European states, so there is no effective safety net. Think of the US portrayed in (as Christmas is fast approaching) “It’s a Wonderful Life” – a life that is hard to the point of brutality with destitution only one mistake away. And there is a level of social control alien to the west, controlling where people can live and work and very repressive of ethnoreligious minorities. And yet there is a feeling of progress and forward momentum which appears to be popular with most people in China.

As Wang notes at the end of his introduction:

“Breakneck” is the story of the Chinese state that yanked its people into modernity – an action rightfully envied by much of the world – using means that ran roughshod over many – an approach rightfully disdained by much of the world. It is also a reminder that the United States once knew the virtues of speed and ambitious construction.

The chapter on the one child policy, which ran for 35 years, is particularly chilling (China announced its first population fall in 2023 and its population is projected to halve to 700 million by 2100), and now the pressure is on women to have more children again. There is also a chapter on how China dealt with Covid – Wang experienced this first hand from Shanghai for 3 years – which made me understand perhaps why we wasted so much money in the UK on Track and Trace. You would need to be an engineering state to see it through successfully, and China ended up taking it too far in the end.

The economics of China is really interesting. As Wang notes:

China’s overbuilding has produced deep social, financial and environmental costs. The United States has no need to emulate it uncritically. But the Chinese experience does offer political lessons for America. China has shown that financial constraints are less binding than they are cracked up to be. As John Maynard Keynes said, “Anything we can actually do we can afford.” For an infrastructure-starved place like the United States, construction can generate long-run gains from higher economic activity that eventually surpass the immediate construction costs. And the experience of building big in underserved places is a means of redistribution that makes locals happy while satisfying fiscal conservatives who are normally skeptical of welfare payments.

This goes just as much for the UK, where pretty much everywhere outside London is infrastructure-starved (and, as Nicholas Shaxson and John Christensen show here in their written evidence to a UK Parliamentary Committee, even where infrastructure is built outside London, the financing of it sucks money away from the area where the infrastructure is being built and towards finance centres, predominantly in London), but there is also strong resistance from all the main parties to significant redistribution via the benefit system. This results in inequalities which even the FT feels moved to comment on and a map of multiple deprivation in England which looks like this:

The good news is that it doesn’t have to be this way in the UK, there are prominent examples of countries operating in a different way, eg China. The bad news is that China is not doing it because of economics. They are doing it because the state was set up to build big from the beginning. It is in its nature. The lesson of China is that it will keep doing the same things whatever the situation (eg trying to fix the population fall caused by an engineering solution with another engineering solution). Sometimes the world economy will reward their approach and sometimes it will punish it, but that will not be the primary driver for how they behave. I think this may be true of the US, the EU states and the UK too.

Daniel Kahneman showed us in Thinking Fast and Slow, how most of our mental space is used to rationalise decisions we have already taken. One of the places where I part company with Wang is in his reverence for economists. He believes that the US should listen more to both engineers and economists to challenge the lawyerly society.

In the foreword for The Principles of Economics Course from 1990 by Phillip Saunders and William Walstad, Paul Samuelson, the first person from the US to win the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1970, wrote:

“Poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the World.” It was a poet who said that, exercising occupational license. Some sage, it may have been I, declared in similar vein: “I don’t care who writes a nation’s laws—or crafts its advanced treaties—if I can write its economic textbooks.” The first lick is the privileged one, impinging on the beginner’s tabula rasa at its most impressionable state.

My view would be that the economists are already in charge.

As a result, my fear is that economics is now used for rationalising decisions we have already made in many countries now, including our own. We are going to do what we are going to do. The economics is just the fig leaf we use to rationalise what may otherwise appear unfair, cruel, divisive and hope-denying policies. The financial constraints are less than they are cracked up to be, but they are a convenient fiction for a government which lacks any guiding principles for spending and investment otherwise and therefore fears that everyone would just be asking for more resources in its absence, and they would have no way of deciding between them.