Day 2 of the UCU Strike: Never explain; never regret; never apologise

09. February 2023 · Write a comment · Categories: Economics, Regulation
Source: https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/boeapps/database/Bank-Rate.asp

As we arrive at the second day of UCU strike action, we move from the industrial austerity discussed in my last blog to monetary austerity. With the latest rise in the Bank of England Base Rate to 4%, it also seems timely to consider the history of Bank of England independence.

Go to the Bank’s own website and you will find all the presentations from a 20 years on celebration of its independence from 2017. Ian McCafferty, External MPC Member at the Bank of England, gave a speech in 2017 about the circumstances of its introduction. The main reason given for the change was credibility of monetary policy.

But is this history entirely accurate? The Brussels and Genoa economic conferences of 1920 and 1922 (previously referred to here, and, as in the previous piece, the source of most of the next couple of paragraphs is from Clara Mattei’s excellent The Capital Order) first introduced the idea of central bank independence from democratic control as something desirable (before World War I, the Bank operated much more as a commercial bank and was the only limited-liability corporation allowed to issue bank notes, which gradually became a monopoly power). As Ralph Hawtrey, a senior economist at the UK Treasury of the time, said, the Bank of England should follow the precept: “Never explain; never regret; never apologise”.

The main reason formal independence does not appear to have been sought in the UK at the time, was that it was unnecessary. Montagu Norman was Governor of the Bank of England from 1920 until 1944, but was very close ideologically to Basil Blackett and Otto Niemeyer, who effectively ran the Treasury during those years. For example in 1927, the Governor of the Bank of France, Emile Moreau, relayed the opinion of the French Ambassador to London at the time: “Winston Churchill [Chancellor at the time]…isn’t really in control of the Treasury. The man who does in fact control it is Sir Otto Niemeyer, the intimate friend of M. Norman”.

The result of this was technocratic control of monetary policy, with politicians unable or unwilling to challenge the Bank or the Treasury. So, when Neville Chamberlain was Chancellor in March 1921, he said that: “the price of money is wholly outside government action”. Similarly, in March 1925 when Winston Churchill was Chancellor, he said that: “I think it would be an inconvenient practice if the Chancellor of the Exchequer were to set the precedent of expressing approval or disapproval of decisions taken at any time by the Bank of England”.

This was despite what, to at least some technocrats, must have been a terrifying increase in the electorate at the end of World War I – the size of the electorate tripled from the 7.7 million who had been entitled to vote in 1912 to 21.4 million by the end of 1918 as a result of the Representation of the People Act of February 1918. This gave the vote to 8.5 million women for the first time (those aged 30 or above and subject to some property requirements) and extended the male franchise to a further 5.2 million (all men over 21 if they were willing to serve British rule).

Technocratic rule ended following the 1945 General Election, when the new Labour Government nationalised the Bank, and the call for an independent central bank only really gained ground in 1992 when it was included in the Liberal Democrat election manifesto in that year. We might perhaps have expected this to have been brought in earlier alongside the change in direction towards monetarism under Margaret Thatcher in 1979. Milton Friedman was probably the best known advocate of monetarism at the time, but Friedman rejected central bank independence on the basis that it would be a bad idea “in a democracy to have so much power concentrated in a body free from any kind of direct, effective political control”.

So, viewed in that way, central bank independence can be viewed as the normal state of affairs, and the 52 years between 1945 and 1997 as the anomaly. One thing that is clear is that central bank independence makes monetary austerity much easier. As Gerard Vissering said at the Brussels Conference of 1920 about central bank independence: “A national or municipal government might possibly be powerless against such pressure on the part of the employees, because the latter can make their political influence felt on national government.” He went on, “…[a]n independent banking institution need not however allow itself to be led by the nose by any power whatsoever exercised by the employees”.

So central bank independence can be seen to be as much about political control as economic management. As McCafferty says, it was introduced for credibility. But credibility with who? Other governments following the same consensus is one answer and the financial markets probably another. There is also the argument about managing expectations within the domestic economy, another form of credibility – ie if people expect monetary policy to be unbending in pursuit of its inflation target, there is no point hoping that this will not be pursued, and therefore the forces pushing up inflation will dissipate sooner (and therefore, the argument is, you actually need generally lower interest rates to achieve your aim). Let’s call it the crushing of hope policy.

This argument does of course depend on the technocrats knowing best. However, as Martin Wolf wrote in the FT about Gordon Brown in May 2010:

...it is far too easy to blame him alone for the UK’s current plight. The truth, I would argue, is that his biggest error was to believe in the conventional wisdom about the prospects for durable economic stability, the robustness of modern financial markets and, surprisingly perhaps, the strength of the post-Thatcher UK economy.

As Blair Fix has pointed out here, increasing interest rates to control inflation looks more like a faith position than one based on much evidence in many cases. How many politicians would be prepared to die on the monetary austerity hill if the central bank were ever to lose its independence again?

Next time: fiscal austerity.

Trade unionism: my part in its downfall (with apologies to Spike Milligan)

13. January 2023 · Write a comment · Categories: Economics, Legal, Regulation
Source: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy Trade Union Membership, UK 1995-2021: Statistical Bulletin, 25 May 2022

It all began for me on 23 September 1985, the first day in my first graduate role as a management trainee at the home counties factory of a security printing firm. From the beginning I was left in no doubt by my new employers that the fairly powerful print unions at the time (SOGAT and the NGA) were the biggest impediment to the captains of industry within the firm from running the business successfully. Occasionally I was allowed into management meetings, where all of the things we could do if it wasn’t for the unions were discussed endlessly.

During my time in this first role, the printing industry changed dramatically: the typesetting was computerised, massively reducing the number employed virtually overnight and Rupert Murdoch set up his non-unionised newspaper factories at Wapping. There had already been three pieces of trade union legislation in the 1980s by the time I started work, the latest being the Trade Union Act of 1984, which required secret ballots for union elections and strikes rather than the show of hands which had been possible up until then. The Miners Strike had also only just ended in March 1985, which had a devastating impact on the trade unions more generally.

Further legislation now quickly followed:

  • the Public Order Act 1986 (which introduced new offences related to picketing, and increased police powers over protests involving groups of 20 people or more);
  • the Wages Act 1986 (which reduced many of the restrictions on employers fining and deducting money from employees’ pay, removed statutory holiday entitlement and reduced state funding for redundancies);
  • the Employment Act 1988 (which gave workers the right to not join a union, and trade union members the right to challenge strike ballots);
  • the Employment Act 1989 (which restricted trade union officials’ time off for duties and abolished government support for redundancy payments);
  • the Employment Act 1990 (which finally removed the closed shop – ie a workplace where union membership was compulsory – and secondary action protection);
  • the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992, which consolidated the legislation of the 80s and 90s, while clarifying that the right to take strike action was protected when it was “in contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute”; and
  • the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993 (which gave trade unions a duty to inform employers of upcoming strikes).

This would appear to have given my first employers everything they could have wanted in terms of containing union power but, after some retrenchment in the 1990s owing to the incoming Labour Government taking the UK back into the Social Chapter of the Maastricht Treaty (which we had originally opted out of in 1992) in 1997, there was further legislation in the form of the Trade Union Act of 2016, which, amongst other measures:

  • introduced a new requirement of 50% of union members to vote in a ballot for strike action;
  • required that workers in important services (health, school education, fire, transport, nuclear decommissioning and border security) must gain at least 40% support of those entitled to vote in a workplace for a strike to be legal;
  • required two weeks’ notice of industrial action to be given to an employer (the employer can agree to one week);
  • limited the right to take industrial action after a strike ballot to six months, or nine months if the employer agrees.

Over the period since 1985, wealth inequality, which had been steadily reducing since at least the end of World War I stalled and has been generally on a slightly increasing trend since:

Source: Resolution Foundation The UK’s Wealth Distribution, December 2020

And the position with respect to income inequality is even worse, with the UK having the 9th worst income inequality of the 38 countries in the OECD:

Source: Income inequality in the UK, House of Commons Library, 30 November 2021

However, perhaps this was a price worth paying, if the forces of creativity and entrepreneurship had at last been allowed full rein, freed from the stifling dead hand of union power? Unfortunately not (TFP stands for total factor productivity in the graph below):

Source: The UK Productivity “Puzzle” in an International Comparative Perspective, Fernald and Inklaar, April 2022

So whatever, the continuing problems of UK PLC, it does not look like union power was ever really one of the major ones. Undeterred, the Government is proposing further restrictions on trade unions and their members, including enforcing minimum service levels during strike action for ambulance staff, firefighters and railway workers and requiring some employees to work during a strike under threat of being sacked if they refuse.

The TUC has made a submission to the International Labour Organisation of the United Nations over what it sees as breaches of Conventions 87 (Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise) and 98 (Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining). As David Allen Green has blogged:

But regardless of your view on the ultimate rights and wrongs of strikes by public sector and other public service workers, there is something fundamentally objectionable in the current government’s proposals to compel certain “key” workers to attend work when they otherwise would be entitled to strike….Simply prohibiting other key workers from being able to strike, without sufficient alternative entitlements and arrangements to balance this loss of a right, is misconceived and illiberal.

It is an authoritarian gesture, rather than a solution to a problem.

Roy Lilley (at the Institute of Health and Social Care Management) in a postscript to a recent blog, focused on what a strategic failure the proposals represent within the NHS industrial dispute:

HMG plans, to ban strike action by some public workers is a further example of ‘push-back’ management. Push the disputes into the courts instead of dealing with the root-cause of strike action, improve industrial relations and representation.

So what has my part been in the downfall of trade unionism to date? In my first job, other than an abortive attempt to develop a new shift pattern(!) for the security guards in the factory, I had few skirmishes with union leaders compared to those with my management colleagues. In the finance sector, where I spent most of the middle 20 years of my working life, I rarely came across any staff representation at all. As a school teacher I joined the ATL rather than the NUT (they have since merged to form the National Education Union) due to its reputation for being determinedly non-militant. And, in my current role, I rather flounced out of the UCU over a difference of opinion over the pensions dispute raging at the time.

So I have not been a very good supporter of trade unionism over the years. However it now seems clear to me that the industrial austerity (ie the crushing of labour power within the economy, further discussed here) described above during my lifetime has been a political rather than an economic project all along. None of the economic justifications given for it since the 1980s have been borne out and the unopposed rugby of industrial management we have increasingly witnessed since has resulted, in my view, in poorer outcomes than if the 99% had been consulted regularly.

I sense that the current Government will only be satisfied when trade union membership levels fall to zero. So if, like me, you don’t want that to happen, the time to push back against running the economy at all times exclusively in the interests of the owners of capital is now.

I have rejoined the UCU.

Work hard, live hard, save hard?

07. January 2023 · Write a comment · Categories: Climate Change, Economics
Photo from the Climate Strike and march in Pittsburgh on 9/24/21. Link from: https://www.flickr.com/photos/9602574@N02/51512352257/. Photo taken by Mark Dixon(https://www.flickr.com/people/9602574@N02). This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 2.0 Generic license.

Mark Blyth wrote a great book about how it was a dangerous idea; Simon Wren Lewis described it as a con; Stephanie Kelton defined it as the “deliberate infliction of harm upon society in the presence of alternatives”; Frances Coppola wrote about its terrible price; Steve Keen described it as naive; Mariana Mazzucato, Robert Skidelsky, Ann Pettifor, David Blanchflower and others wrote in the New Statesman on why the UK should not impose it in response to higher debt following the pandemic; and Richard Murphy gave the possible reasons for imposing it as “ignorance, dogmatism and spite”.

What are all of these economists talking about? Austerity. And nearly all of the criticism thrown at this “dangerous” idea is that it does not work economically (ie it will not bring down government debt levels or boost economic growth, the usual justifications given for pursuing it): a criticism for which there is a large and ever growing data set in support.

Now there are any number of Four Yorkshiremen out there to say that this thing we’re calling austerity is luxury and that we are all snowflakes to complain about it, so let’s be clear about what is meant here. Clara Mattei, in her excellent new book The Capital Order, describes the three forms of austerity policies: fiscal, monetary and industrial, usually used in combination. Fiscal austerity (reducing public spending, particularly on health, education and benefits and increasing the burden of taxation) and monetary austerity (reductions in the money supply and increases in interest rates) are familiar to most of us and normally the only elements of austerity discussed in the media. To these Mattei adds the idea of industrial austerity, which includes (often described as supply side policies, with the connotation of getting the economy fit to compete in world markets) policies aimed at reducing the negotiating power of workers, from anti-union legislation, to reductions in unemployment benefits, minimum wage levels and wage levels and job security within the public sector.

The contention of The Capital Order is that the reason that austerity has been used again and again in the last 100 years, despite repeatedly failing to achieve the economic goals used to justify it, is that its goals have not been economic but political. The political goal of austerity policies is to defend capitalism whenever events make it seem likely that people will look for alternatives (think World War I or the socialism following World War II or the 2008 crash, or now, the pandemic). Whenever government intervention in the economy has been needed on a sufficient scale to demonstrate that economies can strike a different balance between capital accumulation and labour power, austerity has been brought out immediately afterwards to put labour power back in its box, by making nearly everyone too poor, too busy and too regulated to be able to protest about it.

If this premise is accepted, and I think Mattei makes a convincing case in her analysis of post-World War I austerity policies in Italy and the UK, then the implications are profound. Rather than repeated wrong-headed economic policies by people who do not understand economics, we would instead have deliberate political policies by people who completely understand what they are trying to achieve by them.

The other part of the strategy, via the first international financial conferences in Brussels and then Genoa, in 1920 and 1922 respectively, was to establish an international consensus for policies where “individuals had to work harder, consume less, expect less from the government as a social actor, and renounce any from of labour action that would impede the flow of production.” Lord Chalmers, former permanent secretary at the UK Treasury, summarised this approach as: “work hard, live hard, save hard”. The aim was to return to a pre World War I economic orthodoxy and therefore remove what would be very painful economic measures for most people from the political sphere and into the sphere of “economic science”.

A quotation from the League of Nations in 1920 sums up the how important it was that such a consensus be achieved, to make it extremely difficult for any country to stand against it:

This principle must be clearly brought home to the peoples of all countries; for it will be impossible otherwise to arouse them from a dream of false hopes and illusions to the recognition of hard facts.

These “hard facts” then become the justification for sticking with economic policies, however discredited they might be economically, and buttress them: against alternative economic views (the effective shutdown of the New Approaches to Economic Challenges (NAEC) unit of the OECD being the most recent high profile example) and against popular pressure to change course (eg through such measures as central bank independence from government control over monetary austerity or proposed legislation to limit the scope of political protest).

And of course this effective outlawing of alternative schools of economic thought has other implications too. For example, as Steve Keen has shown, the potential impact of climate change in economic models to date has been disastrously underestimated, allowing fossil fuel lobbyists to delay climate action as a result.

We have all three types of austerity in play at the moment in the UK: monetary, fiscal and industrial. We can either believe that this is designed to force our compliance with the mantra to “work hard, live hard, save hard” even if we do not want to, or that it is for the economic reasons given. The former option requires us to believe that the elites in nearly every government in the world are committed to defending capitalism at all costs and that, if we want to contest this, we will have the political battle of our lives on our hands with the odds steadily more stacked against us with every new piece of legislation passed; the latter requires us to believe that our governments are economically ignorant, dogmatic and spiteful. All our current problems and our solutions to them: from the economic crisis, to the ecological crisis and the increasing political crises globally (what Adam Tooze calls the polycrisis) – depend on what we decide to believe.

Cop out

28. October 2022 · Write a comment · Categories: Cartoons, Climate Change, Economics
The Congress of Berlin: Disraeli as a tooth-drawer, assisted by Queen Victoria, operates on Sultan Abdul Hamid II of the Ottoman Empire, surrounded by political figures from France, Germany etc. Coloured lithograph by J.J. van Brederode after Jan Steen, 1878. (Steen, Jan, 1626-1679 Reference: 778482i)

If you think COP27 is just a virtue-signalling tree-hugging “gathering of people in Egypt” then Rishi Sunak’s decision not to attend it will make a lot of sense as he tries to grapple with his domestic economic agenda ahead of the autumn statement next month. The Treasury has said that the aim of the statement will be to “to put public spending on a sustainable footing, get debt falling and restore stability.” If you remember, the cause of the “instability” was the foreign exchange and gilt markets, and the lack of confidence in the UK’s economic management internationally. One of the causes of the problems with the UK’s economic management was a failure to think internationally.

COP27 is, in reality, an important international economic conference. This conference is going to be focused on, amongst other things, food security, water security and investing in the future of energy. The support with energy bills is, of course, a major element in the debt levels Sunak is worrying about and, as the cost of living crisis worsens (exacerbated by the Monetary Policy Committee’s expected further increase in interest rates on 3 November), food security is going to rapidly move up his agenda in the coming months. The only difference between the most important concerns of the autumn statement and COP27 are therefore timeframes. COP27 is about medium to long-term thinking. Sunak has indicated, by not attending, that he is only concerned with short-term thinking.

Then there is the agenda around providing a just transition to a net-zero world (ie not skewed in favour of the already wealthy countries) and the sustainability of communities made vulnerable by climate change. This is where the conference starts to resemble other famous international conferences of the past which made the reputations of British statesmen. The illustration above is from the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when the then Tory Prime Minister, Benjamin Disraeli, “acquired” Cyprus in a great powers carve up of the globe. In 1944, towards the end of the second world war, John Maynard Keynes famously sparred with Harry Dexter White from the US Treasury at Bretton Woods as the post-war economic consensus was thrashed out at an international economic conference. They matter.

Of course we don’t carve up the globe any more, you may think, but yes we do. As George Monbiot has pointed out in his excellent Regenesis, the ghost acres (ie the the area, outside their own land, that farms need to operate) of UK agriculture can be as much as 2-3 times as many as the acres we farm domestically. A WWF report from 2020 suggested that the UK’s overseas land footprint has increased by 15% on average compared to their 2011-15 analysis. Between 2016 and 2018, an area equivalent to 88% of the total UK land area was required to supply the UK’s demand for just seven agricultural and forest commodities – beef and leather, cocoa, palm oil, pulp and paper, rubber, soy, and timber. Every time we insist on domestic economic growth as a non-negotiable element of our economic policy, we are effectively exercising a land grab in the global south to achieve it. If Sunak was interested in establishing himself as an international statesman, he would be at COP27.

And finally, of course, there is the terrible human rights record of the Egyptian state, which needs to be called out and challenged to avoid COP27 being just a public relations victory for the military regime led by General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi.

But Sunak has turned his back on all of that, so that he can spend a bit more time with the spreadsheets and economic forecasts in his bunker in Downing Street. It suggests a small-minded, short-term thinker, lacking in vision and ambition. Copping out should not be an option for any Prime Minister, even during a crisis.

1976 and all that

25. October 2022 · Write a comment · Categories: Economics

Three months ago, there was a lot of talk about 1976. My favourite tweet from the July heatwave was this one:

By contrast, 1976 seems to have disappeared from my Twitter feed altogether now, which is a shame because it was a time when a very different type of UK Government was trying to deal with some very familiar issues.

For instance:

  • Worries about the exchange rate. This is what effectively precipitated the International Monetary Fund (IMF) crisis, with the pound having fallen from the $1.77 level which the Bank of England had been defending with interest rates and reserve purchases ($400 million in September alone) between July and September 1976 to $1.63, with predictions of $1.50 being possible (although $1.63 turned out to be the low point).
  • Worries about the current account deficit, ie the fall of exports relative to imports. Import deposits, where importers needed to put up cash in advance, were being proposed as a possible measure, finally averted as part of the IMF deal.
  • Worries about deficits – cutting the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement or PSBR (what is now called the Public Sector Net Cash Requirement or, more commonly, just the budget deficit) by £1 billion pa was the UK Government’s negotiating position, although less than the IMF wanted.
  • Worries about fuel poverty – cabinet papers from Barbara Castle as the Secretary of State for Social Services in 1975 and 1976 focus on this a lot, with detailed discussion papers about the options for helping different sections of the population. This was also when the first winter fuel allowance was proposed.
  • Cost of living crisis – there were also cabinet papers concerning how to operate price restraint schemes in the wake of a white paper from 1975 called The Attack on Inflation, which involved agreements industry by industry on price increase limits with the CBI, the Retail Consortium and the unions, including specific limits for each of the nationalised industries.

According to Goodbye Great Britain, by Kathleen Burk and Alex Cairncross, published in 1992 about the 1976 IMF crisis, the IMF were partly being used by the US Treasury and other bodies connected with the US administration to force a change in UK economic policy in a way that they would not be able to do directly. There were concerns in the US that the UK would turn its back on the IMF, introduce foreign exchange controls, freeze convertibility, perhaps even default on its loans. Indeed Brent Scowcroft, the US President’s National Security Advisor at the time, said that:

I spent more time on this matter during those weeks than anything else. It was considered by us to be the greatest single threat to the Western world.

That was not the only reason for the IMF to negotiate hard. The 1968 Basle Arrangement on funding sterling balances following the sterling devaluation in 1967 was felt by many countries to have been unduly preferential to the UK compared to how other countries had been treated. The IMF itself was therefore also under scrutiny.

So this was the background to a crisis which seems to have been less about the money (the endorsement of the IMF for its economic policies was more important to the UK for calming the currency markets than the loan according to some accounts, whereas the Under-Secretary for Monetary Affairs at the US Treasury, Edwin Yeo, said that they had “put up the money [for the IMF loan] ‘for the bait’ – ie to hook the UK economy into IMF control when it had to be repaid.”) than about who ran the economy. Andrew Graham, a member of the Prime Minister’s (then Harold Wilson) Policy Unit in 1974 and 1975, remembered the fear of union strength amongst some during that period, with Labour people in Whitehall and Westminster asking each other which side of the barricades they would join – the miners’ or the army’s.

Certainly a year after the agreement the economic crisis seemed to be over. The pound was rising again (it eventually reached $2.40 by October 1980) and reserves increased rapidly. Denis Healey, the Chancellor of the Exchequer at the time, claimed that, if the forecasts he had received had been more accurate, the UK would never have had to go to the IMF, although I do wonder whether another reason would have been found given the concerns of the US Treasury in particular.

However the solution to the economic crisis created a political crisis. In March 1977, the loss of support amongst Labour backbenchers following the Public Expenditure White Paper of 1976 led to an agreement with the Liberal Party (the Lib-Lab Pact) to keep the Government in power and, according to Burk and Cairncross, “one incomes policy too many” led to the Winter of Discontent in the winter of 1978-9, when more than 2,000 workers went on strike in the Liverpool and Merseyside area – rubbish was left uncollected, hospital services were reduced, and bodies went unburied. This was what led to Margaret Thatcher’s election in 1979 and Conservative Government’s and Oppositions and their supporters have continued to refer to this ever since as the consequences of Labour economic policy, rather than the IMF crisis itself.

Yet it was the IMF crisis which seems to have been more formative for Labour. Jim Callaghan made a speech in September 1976, in the middle of the crisis, in which he said the following:

For too long, perhaps ever since the war, we postponed facing up to fundamental changes in our society and in our economy. That is what I mean when I say we have been living on borrowed time…We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession and increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting Government spending. I tell you in all candour that that option no longer exists, and that insofar as it ever did exist, it only worked on each occasion since the war by injecting a bigger dose of inflation into the economy, followed by a higher level of unemployment as the next step.

This statement seems to me to underpin every similar Labour Party statement since, from Liam Byrne’s “I’m afraid there is no money” to Keir Starmer’s recent promise that “there will be no magic money tree economics with us”. It is as if the Labour Party has never stopped trying to prove its credentials to some imaginary IMF mission ever since. The ghosts of 1976 remain with us.

Democratising the Lathe

21. October 2022 · Write a comment · Categories: Cartoons, Economics, Regulation, Science Fiction

I have been thinking a lot about Ursula K Le Guin’s The Lathe of Heaven over the last few weeks, a book I would highly recommend at any time but particularly at the moment. It is the story of a man, George Orr, who can change reality by dreaming. An ability that terrifies him. He is caught taking unprescribed drugs to try and prevent himself dreaming and as a result is sent for a “voluntary therapeutic treatment” with Dr William Haber, a dream specialist. Haber has built a machine called the Augmentor to make it easier for his patients to have dreams directed by him. He starts to work with Orr, becoming increasingly impatient with Orr’s version of the directions Haber is giving to his dreaming in the machine, until eventually Haber dispenses with Orr and connects himself to the machine instead.

Every time reality is changed it is as if it has always been changed. The changes become increasingly dramatic and disruptive until a peak of general insanity now referred to by all as The Break:

All over the world the various gods were being requested, more or less politely, for an explanation of what had occurred between 6.25 and 7.08 pm Pacific Standard Time.

But what the book really focuses on are George’s desperate attempts to live in this increasingly unhinged reality, as the only person (apart from Haber) aware of the abrupt changes swinging it around, and to hang onto the one person, Heather Lelache (or Andrews in the final version of reality they arrive at), he has ever loved.

One of the sentences on the last page (when he finds out that she has married) has stayed with me in particular:

He stood and endured reality.

However hilarious some of the moments of the last few days have been (and let us not forget some of the highlights here, here and here), we are all going to have to endure some significantly altered reality over the coming years as a result, from the moron risk premium to the cost of living crisis slowly rippling through all aspects of life, at a time when we already have a climate emergency and other planet-wide issues we need to be dealing with. There are many arguments to be had about the best way to tackle all of these problems, and I intend to throw myself fully into those arguments.

However, I would propose that we have to prioritise ensuring that, as a society, we never ever again let the lone mad scientist or economist or politician or former talk show host or indeed anyone else, whoever or however charismatic they are, take over sole control of the machine.

I think we need to do three things to achieve this, before we start to argue over policy:

Adopt proportional representation in parliamentary elections. We have got to broaden the support for whoever is in power, rather than stick with the current system which focuses on a tiny number of people in marginal constituencies and ignores pretty much everyone else. Make Votes Matter have agreed a cross-party document (which I have signed) called the Good Systems Agreement. This sets out the options on voting systems to replace first past the post and the best way of getting there. More about what is wrong with our current system (from the Electoral Reform Society) can be found here. Never again should there be a small cabal of people (like this weekend) deciding on who runs the country – with a steadily shrinking selectorate as their ability to achieve consensus on anything dwindles with every successive decision. We no longer have a system in the UK that can make important decisions and the answer is not more technocracy (leaving it to the so-called clever people, however foolish they may be) or plutocracy (leaving it to the rich), it is more democracy, ie including all of us in the decisions we will have to live with.

Reform media ownership and promote plurality in support of a more democratic and accountable media system. The Media Reform Coalition has produced a manifesto for a people’s media which I support: it includes proposals for an Independent Media Commons – with participatory newsrooms, community radio stations, digital innovators and cultural producers, supported by democratically-controlled public resources to tell the stories of all the UK’s communities. This will allow a much greater range of ideas to be presented to the public and discussed than the current Overton window (see below) and greatly improve our national debate about the things that matter.

Source: 99% Organisation

Reform election finance. Recommendations for doing this were provided in the July 2021 report by the Committee on Standards in Public Life, with 47 recommendations following a comparison of political and electoral finance regulation in 12 countries (Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, and the USA), the majority of which are around reforms to campaign practices, meeting emerging threats around the source of donations, delivering greater transparency and enhancing compliance with election finance law.

We have big problems to solve in the UK and we need everyone to be able to contribute if we are going to solve them. However currently:

  • Our votes are counted in a way which effectively wastes most of them;
  • The information we receive about politics is fed to us through a very partial sieve controlled by a small unrepresentative group of people whose vested interests effectively define our Overton Window; and
  • Influence and access to power often appear to go to the highest bidder rather than the best ideas.

All of this needs to change whoever is Prime Minister in the coming weeks, months and years.

Do cuttlefish dream of the passive electroreception of sharks?

02. September 2022 · Write a comment · Categories: Actuarial, Cartoons, Climate Change, Economics
“Tom-and-Jerry-tom-and-jerry-81353_800_600” by momokacma is licensed under CC BY 2.0.

We do it all the time. We assume that the animals around us experience the world as we do, with our obsession with the visual sense. We are used to anthropomorphising animals in our cartoons, but it goes much further than that: for instance if, like a dog, your sensory world or Umwelt is primarily based on smell rather than sight, then that daily walk you take with your dog has very different highlights and notable features (amazingly the slits on the side of a dog’s nostrils allow it to smell on out-breaths as well as in-breaths). We have sayings based on these anthropomorphisms: for example, the “unconcerned” frog in the water as it is heated to boiling (cited by Emily Maitlis in her recent speech in Edinburgh) may not be unconcerned at all, merely showing its distress by filling the air with smells like peanut butter, cashew nuts or curry rather than via the reactions we would expect from a human.

Our vision is not even all that extraordinary compared to some other animals. Mantis shrimps have more classes of photoreceptors covering the ultraviolet spectrum than we have in total. They are the only animals who can detect circular polarization, where the plane in which the light is polarized also rotates. However they are much worse than us at telling our visual range of colours apart and may not even have a conception of colour as we know it at all. We don’t know.

We are not even sure how many senses there are. Aristotle said there were five (sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch), but missed our senses of proprioception (ie awareness of your own body) and equilibrioception (ie sense of balance). There are also animals who have a secondary system for detecting odours, or who detect the body heat of their prey via their brain’s visual centre or have sensors which both detect electric fields and pressure. How should we categorise these and does a clear division between senses make any sense? We don’t know.

Elephants can hear each other several miles apart just after sunset, but we don’t know what they are listening for. Beaked whales have a range of crests, ridges and bumps on their skulls which are not outwardly visible other than via the echolocation they use, but we don’t know why.

And finally, for now, the cuttlefish of the title. When cuttlefish sense sharks, who have passive electroreception (ie the ability to detect electric fields in other animals), they stop moving, hold their breath and cover their gill cavities to reduce the voltage of their electric fields by up to 90%. I could go on, but all of this and so much more is contained in Ed Yong’s masterful An Immense World, which I could not recommend more highly, not only for the content but also for the wonderful joyful writing throughout (AC/DC’s Rock and Roll Ain’t Noise Pollution even gets a mention!).

The recurring theme for me is how much we still don’t know about all of these animals, and the amazing new discoveries which are being made every year. Every animal perceives a different world from the one we think we are living in, many of these perceptions currently (and in some cases perhaps permanently) impossible for us to understand. It takes an extraordinary level of anthropomorphic arrogance for us to convert all of those strange and wonderful lives into the concept of natural capital.

The Institute and Faculty of Actuaries’ Biodiversity and Natural Capital Working Party defined natural capital in their paper from April 2021 (which acknowledges the concerns I am raising here and those raised by others) as follows:

The concept of ‘natural capital’ therefore aims to recognise nature as an asset and aims to ensure that
the goods and services offered by nature become a part of decision making by governments,
businesses, and individuals regarding resource allocation, growth and development.

The Dasgupta Review has gone further, focusing on the economics of diversity. As it acknowledges:

The Review has developed the economics of biodiversity by viewing Nature in anthropocentric
terms. That is an altogether narrow viewpoint, but it has a justification. If, as we have shown in
Part I, Nature should be protected and promoted even when valued solely for its uses to us, we
would have even stronger reasons to protect and promote it if we were to acknowledge that it
has intrinsic value.

I strongly disagree. As George Monbiot pointed out several years ago, markets change the meaning of the things we discuss, replacing moral obligations with commercial relationships. The latest article in The Actuary magazine on natural capital discusses ecosystem collapse in its final paragraph in terms of how it would “negatively impact GDP” and “economic value”.

Once the diversity of nature can be reduced to a monetary amount or metric value, it can obviously be modelled much more easily but, as we have seen again and again within the finance sector and elsewhere, that is at the expense of consideration of any other aspect of our relationship with it.

Perhaps cuttlefish do dream of the passive electroreception of sharks. If they only knew what we were up to, they might instead have nightmares about their balance sheet entries in our spreadsheets.

Ant Music

12. July 2022 · Write a comment · Categories: Cartoons, Economics
But how do they know where they’re going? Spikes! Stop eating them!

I am currently reading a wonderful book – An Immense World by Ed Yong – which I am certain will feature in much of my writing over the next few months. Today I want to talk about what Ed’s book has to say about ants and, in particular, ant pheromones.

Pheromones override all of an ant’s other senses. An ant will walk itself to death if its pheromone trails are laid in a circle (“the army ant death spiral”). And if an ant happens to get covered with one of the pheromones that signal that it is dead, it will continue to be treated as if it is dead however much it protests.

Compared to ants, the current Conservative Party leadership candidates obviously bestride the world like colossi, but I think I have spotted a similarity in the contest so far. Public First have attempted to put all of the policy announcements by each of the candidates together on a single spreadsheet and what is noticeable is that there is only one row which has an entry for every candidate: tax and economic growth. More popular than immigration, Brexit & Europe or any of the other issues one would expect any Conservative leader to have an immediate policy on. And, with one exception (the architect of the current economic policy which has been going in a different direction, Rishi Sunak), they all seem to be proposing a variation on generating economic growth as a result of tax cuts. I will not comment further on whether this is a coherent policy, as that has been done very well here.

However it did occur to me that tax cuts might be doing the same job for Prime Ministerial hopefuls as pheromones do for ants, ie something which, once emitted, makes everything else about your policy positions irrelevant. The problem of course is, whereas the success of an ant colony depends very largely on the coordination of a huge number of individual insects to follow a path, recognise an individual (or more likely a member of a group), identify their own young, etc, the leadership race is supposed to be giving the candidates a chance to differentiate themselves from each other. Even allowing for the fact that many in the race have no expectations of making the last two, but are merely indicating their level of ambition in a way designed to be noticed by one of the two who do, it does seem as if they have already coalesced into two teams – Ready For Rishi and Not Remotely Ready For Rishi. And noone running appears to be obviously looking for a job from Rishi Sunak.

The dangers of making policy a reflex rather than a reflective activity, particularly with respect to the economy, are obvious. Because the pheromones act on all of the ants, including those emitting them, this doesn’t suggest an eventual winner who is likely to be able to change economic direction beyond usual Conservative Party instincts, whatever is actually going on in the economy. Ed Yong has already used the army ant death spiral as a metaphor for the United States’ response to the pandemic.

It should all become a lot clearer tonight when the ones who cannot get 20 MPs to support them will drop out. It would be great if one of them would make a break with Elgar and use Ant Music as their campaign song instead. Then we would all know where we stood.

What Stuart Kirk was not criticised for and what this tells us about financial markets

01. July 2022 · Write a comment · Categories: Climate Change, Economics, Regulation, Risk, Science Fiction

For those of you totally immersed in the daily to and fro of the finance industry, this post about Stuart Kirk will probably seem a little late in the day. For those of you who are not, let me explain briefly what I am talking about today!

Stuart Kirk was Global Head of Responsible Investments at HSBC Asset Management. On 19 May 2022 he gave a talk at the FT Live Moral Money Summit Europe conference with the provocative title of Why investors need not worry about climate risk. Stuart’s talk was a real crowd splitter. Many called for his dismissal (HSBC subsequently suspended him), others regarded his talk as a missed opportunity and full of things which were not true, while others have regarded his stance as speaking truth to power.

However what interests me most about all of the column inches devoted to the affair is what he has not been criticised for and what this tells us about financial markets.

What Stuart said was structured around the following 12 statements:

  1. Unsubstantiated, shrill, partisan, self-serving, apocalyptic warnings are ALWAYS wrong.
  2. As the warnings became ever graver, the more asset prices INCREASED in value.
  3. One of only three explanations can explain the impending end of the world and higher risk asset prices:
    1. Climate risk is negligible.
    2. Climate risk is already in the price.
    3. All investors are wrong.
  4. Even by the UN IPCC own numbers, climate change will have a negligible effect on the world economy – A (large) temperature rise of 3.6 degrees by 2100 means a loss of 2.6 per cent o global GDP. Let’s assume 5%.
  5. Adaption is cheap and effective: climate related costs relative to GDP and mortality rates are down.
  6. Perhaps the biggest error of thinking with climate risk is confusing volumes and values – Plenty of things happen between a volume disruption and a move in asset values.
  7. Climate “winners” and losers” can create value. Climate “winners” and “losers” can destroy value.
  8. The difference between volumes and value is regularly made clear in markets.
  9. Even if climate risk isn’t negligible, it’s too far into the future to matter for most companies.
  10. To make climate change appear like a significant threat, scaremongers are torturing their models.
  11. It’s easy to show that climate change is an investment risk if you engineer a bond market collapse.
  12. Climate change isn’t a long-run risk just like wars, energy crises, pandemics, financial crises and so on (with the graphs shown above to supposedly prove this point).

Can you spot the pattern here? All of these statements are about the map that Stuart is standing in (think of Joey standing in his map to orientate himself in Friends). It is a complicated map of asset prices and charts and reports written by lots of other people standing in the map with Stuart, but it is still just a map. And the map is the territory as far as Stuart is concerned. If something does not appear in his map, it is not worth worrying about. And climate risk is struggling to make it into his map. In Stuart’s view, this is a problem for climate risk, and the people “torturing” their models to make climate risk appear significant and piling him up with regulatory reporting responsibilities are very annoying.

But of course this take is completely upside down. This is not a problem for climate risk. Rather climate risk is a problem for us and the fact that it does not appear in our models unless we torture them (which I am sure is true) means that we have the wrong models. Because the scientific consensus about the consequences of climate change on our current trajectory of between 3 and 4 degrees warming are (amongst others from Mark Lynas’ Six Degrees: Our Future on a Hotter Planet):

Africa […] split between the north which will see a recovery of rainfall and the south which becomes drier […] beyond human adaptation.
Indian monsoon rains will fail. The Himalayan glaciers providing the waters of the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra, the Mekong, Yangtze and Yellow rivers [will decrease] by up to 90%.
The Amazonian rain forest basin will dry out completely. In Brazil, Venezuela, Columbia, East Peru and Bolivia life will become increasingly difficult due to wild fires which will cause intense air pollution and searing heat. The smoke will blot out the sun. Drought will be permanent in the sub-tropics and Central America.
Australia will become the world’s driest nation.
In the US Gulf of Mexico high sea temperatures will drive 180+ mph winds. Houston will be vulnerable to flooding by 2045. Galveston will be inundated. Many plant species will become extinct as they will be unable to adapt to such a sudden change in climate.
The [IPCC] in its 2007 report concluded that all major planetary granaries will require adaptive measures at 2.5° temperature rise regardless of precipitation rates.[and] food prices [will] soar. Population transfers will be bigger than anything ever seen in the history of mankind. [The feedback effects from the] Amazon rain forests dry[ing] out and wild fires develop[ing] [will lead] to those fires [releasing] more CO2, global warming [intensifying] as a result, vegetation and soil begin[ning] to release CO2 rather than absorb[ing] it, all of which could push the 3° scenario to a 4°-5.5° [one].

Much of the discussion about the talk was that Stuart was speaking out bravely and that HSBC had only suspended him to silence inconvenient truths, that he had been silenced by “extreme environmental ideology“. I have no idea about all of the reasons why HSBC suspended Stuart other than their official statements, but it seems clear to me that many people in the finance industry agree with what he said. This suggests to me an extreme ideology of its own of resolutely refusing to look out of the window.

In Kim Stanley Robinson’s excellent New York 2140, global sea levels have risen by 50 feet. Everyone lives in tower blocks connected by sky bridges which occasionally topple into the canals which were once streets. I used to think that money markets would not survive events like this, but Robinson posits what I believe is a more likely future scenario. The Intertidal Property Pricing Index is developed instead, carefully constructed to be reasonably stable despite the instability of the actual real estate being valued, and people bet on it. And soon everyone is fixated on what this index is saying daily rather than the buildings collapsing around them.

This is exactly what our finance sector will do of course, there will be money to be made out of such activities after all. And so expectations that they will, in any way, be a leader out of the climate emergency are, in my view, unrealistic.

We will however need the finance industry to facilitate aspects of how we transform our economies over the next 10 to 20 years. And this will involve much more of the regulation which annoys Stuart and others so much.

Could climate change slash global GDP by 18%? It’s much worse than that

05. May 2021 · Write a comment · Categories: Actuarial, Climate Change, COVID-19, Economics, Prediction, Risk

Last week, the news from the Actuary magazine was that climate change could slash global GDP by 18%. This was based on a Swiss Re report, the economics of climate change, from which the analysis above is taken.

According to the report, “The current trajectory of temperature increases, assuming action with respect to climate change mitigation pledges, points to global warming of 2.0–2.6°C by mid-century.” It was unclear why they had decided to stop at 2050, when current commitments continue to push temperatures up until 2100. And the scenarios from the IPCC’s AR5 Synthesis Report (see below) show that the path we are currently on diverges far more considerably from the Paris agreements after 2050. Climate effects are very long-term and many of the impacts of a 2-3°C warming would be irreversible ones, ensuring continuing losses at similar or greater levels for decades to come, and that is before we even consider the much higher probabilities of feedback effects: from the melting of the permafrost, additional methane releases, loss of Amazonian carbon and the loss of the albedo reflectivity of Arctic ice. The Swiss Re report makes clear that is has not considered these.

You might notice that there is a separate column to the left, in a different colour, with the title “Well-below 2°C increases” and sub-title of “Paris target”. It is actually an agreement which 189 countries have signed up to, including the UK. As the Paris Agreement says (Article 2 Point 1):

This Agreement, in enhancing the implementation of the Convention, including its objective, aims to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change, in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty, including by:
(a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature
increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risks and impacts of climate change;

There has been some debate over whether the Agreement is aiming for 1.5°C warming with a 50% chance of staying below it, or for “well below” 1.5°C similar to the 2°C goal with a 66% chance of avoiding more than 1.5°C warming, but the modelling used for the next IPCC report has adopted the latter definition. Either way, I cannot see why Swiss Re has decided to put the Paris Agreement targets in a different column from what it calls the “likely range of temperature gains” as if those we have committed to are no longer feasible to aim at.

In saying this, I do not underestimate the massive challenge of keeping to the Paris target. As Mark Lynas says in Our Final Warning, at the end of 2018 over 1,000 GW of additional fossil-fuelled electrical power generation capacity was planned, permitted or already under construction around the world, equivalent to adding an additional 188 Gt CO2 into the atmosphere to the 658 Gt already baked in from existing infrastructure, which gives a total of 846 Gt of CO2 not including impacts from deforestation, agriculture and future land-use change. This compares to a future carbon budget as estimated at the end of 2018 by the IPCC (although estimates of this vary considerably) of 420 Gt of CO2 (or 1,170  Gt of CO2 for 2°C warming). So an extraordinary change of direction is required and we should be very cautious of getting anywhere near these limits when we do not know precisely where they are.

Which brings me onto the modelling of economic impacts. The first thing to say is that modelling in terms of impact on GDP, while guaranteed to get the attention of the financial community, is perhaps not the best way of communicating the devastation of runaway climate change.

In the summary of Mark Lynas’ excellent book Six Degrees: Our Future on A Hotter Planet , which summarised the scientific consensus already arrived at by 2007, the three degree increase for which damages are being estimated is expected to lead to Africa […] split between the north which will see a recovery of rainfall and the south which becomes drier […] beyond human adaptation. Indian monsoon rains will fail. The Himalayan glaciers providing the waters of the Indus, Ganges and Brahmaputra, the Mekong, Yangtze and Yellow rivers [will decrease] by up to 90%. The [IPCC] in its 2007 report concluded that all major planetary granaries will require adaptive measures at 2.5° temperature rise regardless of precipitation rates.[and] food prices [will] soar. Population transfers will be bigger than anything ever seen in the history of mankind. [The feedback effects from the] Amazon rain forests dry[ing] out and wild fires develop[ing] [will lead] to those fires [releasing] more CO2, global warming [intensifying] as a result, vegetation and soil begin[ning] to release CO2 rather than absorb[ing] it, all of which could push the 3° scenario to a 4°-5.5° [one]. The recent update to this: Our Final Warning, describes “entering the three-degree world means we are now living in a hotter climate than any experienced on Earth throughout the entire history of our species”. These impacts, which are likely to pose existential risks for many, appear totally inconsistent with the economic loss modelling shown above.

In his 2020 paper, The appallingly bad neoclassical economics of climate change (apologies, Journal access required), Steve Keen says in the abstract:

Forecasts by economists of the economic damage from climate change have been notably sanguine, compared to warnings by scientists about damage to the biosphere. This is because economists made their own predictions of damages, using three spurious methods: assuming that about 90% of GDP
will be unaffected by climate change, because it happens indoors; using the relationship between temperature and GDP today as a proxy for the impact
of global warming over time; and using surveys that diluted extreme warnings from scientists with optimistic expectations from economists. Nordhaus has misrepresented the scientific literature to justify using a smooth function to describe the damage to GDP from climate change. Correcting for these errors makes it feasible that the economic damages from climate change are at least an order of magnitude worse than forecast by economists, and may be so great as to threaten the survival of human civilization.

There follows a demolition of the methodologies employed by Nordhaus and others in this field. To be fair to the Swiss Re report, some of the criticisms in Keen’s paper appear to have been borne in mind when constructing their model, eg:

A shortcoming of our model build so far is that some economic impacts are linearly estimated: non-linearities are not adequately captured. We use multiplicative factors of 5 and 10 to simulate the increasing severity of outcomes from nonlinearities… Importantly, the framework does not consider
tipping points, events such as the partial disintegration of ice sheets, biosphere collapses or permafrost loss, that pose a threat of abrupt and irreversible climate change. This is because it is thought that tipping points will materialise well after our model horizon of mid-century only.

And as the Swiss Re report also acknowledges:

It is likely that the estimated impacts of GDP damages from climate change will rise as existing modelling develops to incorporate economic linkages in trade, migration and other channels, and to generalise the results to multiple countries.

And they are getting criticisms from the usual suspects of climate denial, eg Bjorn Lomberg on Twitter here, that even their attempts to date to quantify the uncertainties caused by non-linearity are a step too far.

And yet there remains a problem with these analyses in that they fail to capture existential risk. One of the things Steve Keen points out in his paper is the different attitude Nordhaus found towards estimating damages from climate change in natural scientists as opposed to economists. Natural scientists typically estimated the damage at 20-30 times higher than economists and some refused to cooperate with the exercise at all:

I must tell you that I marvel that economists are willing to make quantitative estimates of economic consequences of climate change where the only measures available are estimates of global surface average increases in temperature. As [one] who has spent his career worrying about the vagaries of the dynamics of the atmosphere, I marvel that they can translate a single global number, an extremely poor surrogate for a description of the climatic conditions, into quantitative estimates of impacts of global economic conditions. 

But how do you calibrate what is clearly a complicated model that Swiss Re and Moody’s have constructed for this analysis? Obviously we all have a very recent GDP fall in our minds at the moment – here is a summary from the UK Commons Library of Economic Indicators as at 30 April 2021 (themselves sourced from OECDstat and Eurostat):

This shows an almost identical GDP fall of 10.5% year on year in Q2 2020 for the OECD as predicted in the event of a 3.2°C warming, although it has bounced back pretty quickly since. For a longer term view of the global data, Our World In Data have an Annual growth in GDP per capita graph which runs from 1961 to 2017 (see below).

One very large GDP fall which stands out in the data here is the 26.5% fall in China in 1961. This was towards the end of the China’s Great Famine, in which approximately 3 million people died of starvation over a 3 year period. This certainly qualifies as an existential event and Swiss Re’s modelling suggest something of similar proportions in Asia and Africa at 3.2°C warming.

The biggest danger in all of this is that rich countries will look at a 10.6% reduction in GDP (at 3.2°C warming) and think this liveable with and adaptable to for their populations. After all, Simon Wren Lewis calculates that the austerity policies between 2010 and 2018 in the UK reduced GDP by nearly half of this amount every year for at least the second half of this period, compared to where it would have been without these policies, with an estimated cumulative loss of 15.9% of GDP. An 18.1% overall world average loss, however, effectively means more than a 25% loss for the rest of the world outside the OECD, as the OECD accounts for around half of the world’s total GDP which, even if we did not allow for the acknowledged likelihood that these are underestimates, is still in the Chinese Famine category of disaster and neither liveable with nor adaptable to.

We are already seeing vaccine nationalism carve up the world between rich and poor countries, with up until last month only 0.3% of the vaccines administered around the world having gone to people in low-income countries. This is likely to reduce the ability of poorer countries to be represented properly at this year’s COP26 when it frames a global response to the climate change which will affect them so disproportionately. And the losses if we do not act will be measured in far more frequent floods and sea level rise, extreme storms and heatwaves, crop failures, water and food shortages and mass migration on a scale we have never seen before, not GDP.

Could climate change slash global GDP by 18%? It’s much worse than that.

 

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